

# LIBERAL DEMOCRACY OR TOTALITARIAN UTOPIA

**HANS CHRISTIAN ROTT**

*Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University*

## Introduction

Many American universities are faced today with a certain degree of decay in the cohesion between institution and society. One major cause of this decay is that the differentiation between education, which belongs to the liberal arts and training, which belongs to the servile arts has become unclear. This simple and rather pragmatic problem set, which really is a reflection of bad education on the part of those who now are at the peak of their economic and political strength, generally outside of the academy, is being compounded by the internal conflicts created by the academy itself.

Traditional fields have identified themselves through epistemological parameters. This is what gave them and gives them legitimate spheres of operations, within which operational freedom is guaranteed, for both student and professor. The extreme position in these fields tends towards foundationalist epistemology. Nontraditional fields have identified themselves through primarily anthropological and sociological parameters, such as gender studies, race studies, etc. Their extreme positions tend towards coherentist epistemology. Although it is often treated as a great secret, generally particular political persuasions are connected to these academic positions. The academic debate in the "post-modern" period has centered largely around two resulting points of contention. One is the accusation by the liberal left that epistemologies are nothing more than smoke screens with no real connection to the realities of knowledge and therefore are just protective mechanisms for an anachronistic "elite." They deny that the traditional parameters are either essential or necessities. Those accused of this contend that nontraditional fields lack legitimacy by not establishing necessary parameters, and instead claim that their contingent characteristics are adequate to form reliable, testable, foundations of knowledge. The central problem lies in the lack of understanding that epistemological questions cannot be resolved through social answers.<sup>1</sup>

That much of this debate centers around method and ideology and is largely taking place outside the realm of philosophy has not contributed in a positive way to the extramural understanding of the situation. What seems to be clear to the public is that the confusing signals the university emits warrant closer scrutiny of what is perceived to be antiquated economic perks, particularly in light of the fact that the corporate/consumer image the institutions have adopted vulgarizes the academic position

to the point where everyone feels entitled and enabled to become a player in the shaping of values and adherent policies.<sup>2</sup> It is the political arena in which those questions are debated and rightfully so. This is in no way a new phenomenon and is in almost the same form applicable to the education of architects. The question of epistemology moves into the realm of aesthetics and technological science, creating an additional layer of complexity to the original problem.

The institutions at discussion in this paper all were subject to the same basic political scrutiny as today's universities experience. What makes the situation of the schools discussed here remarkable is that they are the most poignant examples of the influence of emancipatory ethics on design pedagogy. It is through the study of those institutions, and because of their influence on the American academy that we can assume a degree of certainty in the assessment of what seems to be the most recent and widely read summary of the "directions" in which design education in the U.S. is supposed to go.

While generalizations are particularly risky when applied to one's own time it is of no great risk to say that the Boyer report has all the characteristics of an eudaemonistic utopia, and in this sense is totalitarian, while the study of the recent history of schools like those discussed here and the study of pedagogy in general show that, generally speaking, emancipatory ethics and non-authoritarian pedagogies are not suitable for the education of architects and designers.<sup>3</sup>

An explanation of the two conflicting pedagogical positions this paper employs for analysis is now in order. The first position assumes that the student is an individual human being, socialized to the community, who happens to have chosen to be an architect. As such, he or she is pursuing a good life through the means of the chosen field. It is a teleological belief-structure which makes it possible for this individual to deal with the eschatological nature of human endeavors; this human being actively pursues life, accepting the responsibilities of autonomous participation in the community. Because of this particular characteristic, which takes a deontological position and accepts categorical imperatives as basis for just rule, architecture will become the outlet in which the student will fulfill himself and because he does not want to do anything but the best for himself, he will also do the best for society.<sup>4</sup> The adherent ethical position is fundamentally hermeneutic,<sup>5</sup> and the intellectual foundation lies in

practical reason.<sup>6</sup> The resulting political position would be intellectually democratic,<sup>7</sup> but not necessarily antiauthoritarian. In other words, this position believes in just rule, since political rule by definition governs the public well being and not the private life. This student will distinguish between work and leisure,<sup>8</sup> and will view work not as the reason for life but as a means.<sup>9</sup> The educational position is emancipating.

The second position assumes that the student is a human being victimized by society. Since the idea of a good life in itself is a construct of society it is an inadequate goal for any human being, regardless of what field he or she might pursue, in order to serve society. Since all authority is suspect, certainty in moral questions is at best relativized, ethics are determined by values, which are the results of hypothetical imperatives. Any such imperative (*summum bonum*) is generally determined by pragmatic parameters, most commonly in the form of social eudemonism. Whether the *summum bonum* is an idealized future state, the achievement of which is the responsible collective direction of all individual efforts, or whether it is the prohibition of smoking or the abolition of certain words from the collective memory makes really no difference. In the western world, as well as in what used to be the east block the most prevalent societal value, overriding all others is the frictionless functioning of the system.<sup>10</sup> We speak in this case of functionalized society.<sup>11</sup> The individual becomes a functionary, either mediating or receiving mediation between his situation and the surrounding circumstantial world,<sup>12</sup> towards collectivization or direct objectification through his work or the consumption of the product of his labor. The adherent ethical position is value ethics the philosophical foundation is Rousseau-Marxist.<sup>13</sup> The resulting political position would be liberal democratic and antiauthoritarian. This student will find work and change as the two justifications for human existence. The total-work world is part of the totalitarian utopia. The educational position is emancipatory.

The next paragraphs will attempt to illustrate how the Werkbund, the Bauhaus, the Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm and the School of Architecture at VPI have moved between those two theoretic extremes.

### Der Deutsche Werkbund

It seems that any discussion of modern design education should start at least with Herrmann Muthesius. His ideas, which were instrumental in the formation of the Werkbund, were also directly effecting the formation and program of the early Bauhaus. Muthesius was, from 1904 onward, directly involved in the reconstruction of the educational programs of the technical colleges and the schools for the applied arts (Kunstgewerbe Schulen) for the Prussian Ministry of Commerce. Departing from the aesthetic of the "English House" which was in Bacon's words "not to look at but to live in," (a premonition of the "machine to live in?") Muthesius proposed the cooperation of industry, crafts and arts to buttress the production of qualitatively superior products, based on a new "machine aesthetic" in order to improve the faltering economy of Prussia before the First World War. His political program

was very clear. The various interests of the partners in the Werkbund would pursue their own best interest and thus produce internally competitive tension. The resulting energies channelled towards a common goal (national economic well being) would improve and reinvent the German industrial product. Externally, the competitors in the European and world market would be confronted with a propaganda-controlled unified German industrial front. Architecture was not a primary concern initially, since industrial production was more an issue of things like furniture and generally attached to urban and rural housing. Due to this, the aesthetic position which Muthesius steered towards ran afoul of several of the more influential members of the Werkbund, with Van de Velde in the lead and Bruno Taut finally giving him the final push out.<sup>14</sup> Gropius benefited from this internal strife in the Werkbund in his positioning for the leadership of what was to become the Bauhaus. Ideologically and aesthetically he was actually very close to Muthesius, but as a shrewd politician and because he personally disliked him, he sided with Van de Velde and the "artists" at the Colon exhibit. Although a belated movement towards housing did change the Werkbund even more towards industrialized design away from ornament and towards internationalism, away from nationalistic politics, its internal political and programmatic difficulties kept it from establishing any explicit direction.

Educationally, the Werkbund and the educational institutions connected to it never could surpass the apprenticeship model, due to this inability to surmount the self-serving concerns of craft and the adhered organizations. The initial ideas, which Gropius and Muthesius shared and expressed in the 1913 Werkbund yearbook, were in a much more concise way applied in the foundation of the Weimarer Bauhaus.<sup>15</sup> However, Gropius understood that the fruitful cooperation with industry and crafts could only materialize if strong authoritative positions were assumed by the educational institutions. He never saw himself and his students as mere service providers for future employers.<sup>16</sup>

### The Bauhaus

We must skip over the interesting prehistory of the Bauhaus, for the sake of brevity. Suffice it to say that the reason Gropius sided against Muthesius at the Colon exhibit was personal and not substantive. From a socio-political standpoint, the concern of the early Bauhaus was with the individual. Even the postwar flirtation with socialist ideology, which in Gropius took the expression of "being done with the trash of the past" was not inclusive of a collectivist program.<sup>17</sup>

Aside from the authoritatively oriented general direction set and maintained by Gropius, the Bauhaus never had a common pedagogical direction. This would have contradicted the ethical and philosophical position which Gropius maintained and still expressed in the fifties. Yet each one of the masters had a clearly expressed pedagogical position. That they formed occasional alliances had more to do with the dynamics of the environment than with any planned organization by Gropius. The only exception might have been Gertrud

Grunow, who was positioned to reach all individual students with her extraordinary ability to empathize and to recognize specific talents.<sup>18</sup> The ethical foundation, until Hannes Meyer assumed the directorship, was substantive; the concerns for harmonious existence of the artist was individually directed.

The general political fortunes of the Bauhaus followed the general economic conditions until the Social Democrats lost the local elections to the National Socialists. I will use as a reference the analysis of Friedhelm Kröll since its three phased model is in agreement with the other two models, the one of three phases following the directors, Gropius, Hannes Meyer and Mies, and the other by location, Weimar, Dessau and Berlin, but it is more precise for my purpose since it structures itself according to socio psychological and ideological aspects.<sup>19</sup>

The Consolidation phase and the Creation phase are both markedly oriented towards substance ethics, with social functionality being a product of the adherence to these ethics. In other words, while the social function of art and architecture was one of the goals and sometimes the goal of the collective pedagogies, the pedagogies themselves were substance driven. Prestabilization of either internal relationships or external connections of educational nature was not the determining factor in the Bauhaus structure, nor the goal in its mission. This is probably one of the most critical factors in Gropius's politics. The understanding that his school would disrupt "stable" situations in art and craft circles. This is probably why he distanced himself from Muthesius personally, because the idea of the creation of a new aesthetic platform caused the most violent responses directed against Muthesius and Gropius did not want to tip his hand too early in the game.

The disintegration phase is marked by Hannes Meier's tenure as the director of the Bauhaus, following Gropius return to private practice in Berlin. With Hannes Meyer, functional ethics are introduced into the operations and the curriculum. Meyer's social agenda, as well as his anti-aestheticist position clearly show a sharp turn away from the concern with the individual towards education in the service of society. The contrast lies in the view of the purpose of education which underlies such a position. The individual is not educated for himself, with the trust that then he will do the best for society but the individual is directly educated for society. It is a Rousseau-Marxist standpoint and brings us in a strange way to a confrontation with another form of functional ethic, namely fascism and national socialism. Even Mies could not or would not change the direction the internal political situations had taken. Since the Bauhaus had become the victim of two conflicting value ethical utopias, communism and national socialism, it could not overcome the external political pressures and closed its doors after a brief period as a private institution. Gropius had strenuously maintained the necessity for political nonalignment. The totalitarian methods of the national socialists initially made institutional partisanship out of personal politics and then forced Hannes Meyer and Mies' hand. The conflict between two totalitarian utopias on the grand scale could not spare an educational institution. Even the slightest possibility of the seeds of dissent to be sown in the minds of future generations was too much of a risk to take.

## Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm

Summing up the entire prelude to the involvement of Max Bill with the formation of a Hochschule für Gestaltung in Max Bill's letters to his American contact McCloy, as well as Gropius' letter in support of Bill's standpoint, it was clear that the HfG was intended to avoid the trap of the late Bauhaus development (declining phase) and to make its primary goal the education of individuals as Designers. The assumption was that there is real efficacy in education as long as it allowed the democratic access and exercise thereof to each individual. That education is its own reward, like virtue, was a very fundamental position for Gropius and Bill. The risk of education in the truly free sense lies in the unpredictability of the outcome, as any educator should know. That this makes education always suspect relative to the status quo and its beneficiaries is just as well known.

The correspondence with McCloy brought about the "donation by the American People" in the amount of one million Mark. It was symbolically and literally handed to Inge Scholl.<sup>20</sup> How strongly Bill felt about keeping direct political influence out of the school is emphasized by the fact that he pushed for and finally achieved the name change from the Geschwister Scholl Hochschule to the Hochschule für Gestaltung, Ulm. Although the Siblings were political martyrs, or even because of it, the name was viewed as an encumbrance due to its history. Inge Scholl herself agreed. The Foundation Scholl was to be the administrative and financial entity controlling the school.

After the formulation of the first program of 1950, Gropius' critique supports this position. Inge Scholl and Max Bill developed a program, which was also a skeleton curriculum. In its first explanation, it sounded very much like the program of the Werkbund, in its emphasis on the reconstruction of Germany's trustworthiness relative to the world, as well as the establishment of German quality products in the world market. Max Bill objected to the very idea of teaching in the advertising area; again he fell back on the consolidation phase of the Bauhaus. He stated that the architectural and urbanistic areas were to be the main thrust of his work and that all other design, as far as it had to do with mass-produced articles in support of the urban functions, was to be part of that thrust. The Scholl-Bill program of April 1950 started out in a very similar and (relative to previous statements) congruous fashion. However, the new program abruptly changes course when it comes to the projection of outcomes. (Whether de-Nazification accelerated the functionalization of German society or not, the belief that ideological reaction to national socialism and communism would by its own virtue be a safeguard against relativistic value-ethics was erroneous.) At this point the doors were opened to utopian ideologies. Gropius in his letter to Bill expresses that much very directly. The program functionalizes the school by wanting to assure that the graduate would be politically astute. However, and this I believe is Otl Aicher's doing, not through philosophy and history, to the contrary, by abolition of the connection to the past and through the abstract educational device of "political methodology." The other error in the program was one of lack of philosophical clarity as well; Bill's

principle of “critical pedagogy” was not only a misnomer, but also the result of faulty reasoning. Where Aicher saw the socio-political specialist, as a pendant to the designer as specialist, already as a functionary hierarchically above the worker and the employer, Bill saw the Master as the critically-pedagogically gifted teaching personality. (I would say that Olivio Ferrari was the one person I am aware of who could live up to this expectation. However he made the same error that Bill made — too few individuals can be found at any one time to fit the bill and to produce the critical mass necessary to maintain a school.) Gropius expressed his doubts about the possibility of a school in which “methodology of politics” and “artistic creation could be taught at the same time.” He foresaw precisely the factors which caused the demise of the HfG — a task not too difficult since the Bauhaus failed for the same reasons. Being that the contradicting nature of the two disciplines and the necessary human characteristics of their proponents would lead to strife and disruption.

Here we have a clear view of the error which Gropius so carefully tried to avoid. He understood above all that there are no static stabilities in any human interaction. It for this reason that he spent most of his Bauhaus years balancing carefully the various individuals he brought there for the precise reason of their individuality and the resulting excellence in their fields. Hannes Meyer’s political stabilization, through the formulaic programming of the curriculum destroyed the Bauhaus. The substance of the school, its artistic, philosophical and material content became relativized, and with it the individuals who held this substance, in order to facilitate the functioning of the whole in a frictionless social purpose. That by their very nature none of those people could become functionaries was always clear to him. This is what his letter to Bill from May 1950 is about: “The development of artistic abilities must be absolutely free. Politics, the press, publicity have to be subordinated, not the other way around. Politics can never give directions for artistic creation.”<sup>22</sup>

Again we have to leap over more detailed development to the year Max Bill left the HfG and to the circumstances leading up to this event. Bill’s decision, in 1955, to name a College of Rectors came partially to reduce his workload but, I believe, primarily as response to the pressure of Maldonado, Gugelot and Aicher. The reason for the younger lecturers to push for his reduction in responsibilities could have been originally in fundamental differences of design-theoretic nature, which by necessity were founded in ideological or philosophical differences. Bill’s comparison of Maldonado’s theory and Hannes Meyer’s is a hint in this direction. The success Gugelot had in the Braun Design series was definitely factor in the confidence with which the younger generation pursued the issue. The socio-political climate in Germany as well as the Wirtschaftswunder economics furnished the bigger framework for, which Gropius already saw as inevitable.

The goal of the Marshall plan, to make Germany, the Ally, economically stable and prosperous led to an accelerated growth from industry covering immediate and local necessities to surplus and export production

which served as the foundation of consumer confidence, which in turn changed the demand structure.<sup>21</sup> From a philosophical perspective, this growth was paralleled by a hardening response to the double defeat of the ideological ambitions of Germany, which expressed itself in nihilism in all possible forms. A value ethical response, not unlike in the east block (except the *summum bonum* was not the state as such in an ideal future, but functioning of production towards the fulfillment of materialistic dreams) started to take hold. The systematic-systemic functioning of the state as the surrogate of the nation served all masters. The nationalistic remnants, which could not really reemerge fully with half of the nation the enemy, could be channelled into an ideology of comparative living standards. This kept a safe distance from communism (if not from Marxism as the 1960s showed) while rendering German philosophy as a basis for intellectual growth undesirable, since it opposes objectification and thus collectivization and stands in the way of consumerism.

The HfG fared very well in this economy. Being both contributor and beneficiary, the pressure to reduce substance in content and replace it with function and process became dominant. While Bill stood his ground on the principle of the necessity auf authoritarian means in matters of culture, the college of Rectors found that, “the spiritual and human emancipation of designers as well as the overall idea of the Ulmer Hochschule would be best served through collective leadership.” That this is the foundation of all emancipatory ideologies, to want the best for the individual through collectivizing him, has been no secret since Rousseau and Karl Marx. It is worth mentioning that Max Bill himself accused Maldonado and Aicher of just this error. As Max Bense expressed it: “That in this house economic and political interests are better represented than are spiritual and intellectual ones.” When Max Bill in his letters to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung protested the “power politics” of the College of Rectors he emphasized what Robert Spaemann calls the Utopia of Freedom from Rule (*Herrschaftsfreiheit*).<sup>22</sup>

## VPI and SU

I will not go into an analysis of the Chicago Institute of Design, which Gropius suggested as an example for Max Bill, but turn to the School of Architecture at VPI, under the deanship of Charles Burchard and Charles Steger and the spiritual and intellectual guidance of Olivio Ferrari. Ferrari was an assistant of Max Bill in Ulm, Burchard a student of Gropius at Harvard and Charles Steger is a former student of both.

When Olivio Ferrari came from Auburn to VPI, the university was still in a pre-functionalised state, like most land grant universities were, before the accelerated growth period of the seventies. I believe faculty used to be still appointed instead of hired. Into this receptive, if provincial, setting, Olivio Ferrari introduced, with some minor adjustments due to the location and due to his personal understanding of pedagogy and the situation, a concept of a school in many ways similar to the Gropius-Bill model. The School of Architecture was founded as part of the College of Engineering and was very much run along traditional American pedagogical and didactic lines. The

“inner college” became the experimental educational bastion, which, for a brief time evolved into the school as a whole. Ferrari was a master at maintaining that same fine balance among extreme individuals that Gropius had, and which was to a large degree lacking in Max Bill. Burchard maintained the external political connections at a harmonious level much with the same finesse which built the school on the inside. Thus the school grew and became globally known as an entity in itself, albeit with the often erroneous assumption that it was a clone of the Bauhaus or of Ulm.

As I mentioned earlier in this text, the difficulties in finding an adequate amount of individuals, who would fit the “master” image of either Gropius or Bill, to run a school, combined with the low mobility of the faculty of a school without the industrial connections of either of its predecessors, gave the institution a different character from the outset. The main difference in Ferrari’s approach was that teaching design was different from teaching how a master designed. This is what made Virginia Tech from the outset a stronger school than the Bauhaus, although it did not give or demand the same external exposure through work to the faculty, which the other two schools had. Rather than seeing the location of the school as a drawback it was turned into an asset; in combination with the Europe program it became truly a place of education and not a training facility. Another major difference was the administrative structure. Burchard took care of the administrative and therewith the external political components while Ferrari was able to concentrate on making teachers and architects out of students, by teaching.

The ever-increasing external pressures on the state universities and land grant universities did not pass by VPI. The university as a service for commerce became the prevalent paradigm. Integration into the market place was the goal of the 1970s and 1980s. Probably in response to this Burchard looked for a new model, more in line with the prevailing political understanding. The “teaching hospital” was the closest which could be found. However it was a rather unfortunate choice. While strategically it supported the existence of the school in the long run, through the broadening of its base by acquiring departments (we even acquired a political department in the eighties), it found itself educationally in the same situation Ulm found itself in.

With the increasing pressures of accountability, measured against economic functionality, political processes found fertile ground amongst those who had already bought into the “process is your product” stratagems of the 1960s. Sociology replaced philosophy as the binding matter of interdisciplinary connections and the school got degraded to department, in order to make the functional fit with the rest of the university more frictionless. The name change to Virginia Tech occurred at the same time roughly. This is also the point at which the virtues of the location started to work against the model that Ferrari had worked for. The opportunity to practice was not present, but practice as a didactic component was and still is not even encouraged. With the teaching hospital model, this became a glaring shortcoming to the ignorant. Hospitals have a rather

captive clientele. Architects don’t, particularly if they are barred from state commissions, which constitute the main source of commissions for faculty in most European countries.

Charles Steger inherited this functionalization situation and yet managed to even consolidate its off campus programs, which for a time served and are still serving as residuals of the original intentions. It would not do the institution and those who are keeping it in operation justice to go further. Vivisection is never a good idea, although in some academic circles it is viewed as critical. It serves better to look at the latest document concerned solely with the education of architects to assess the current general trends.

### The Boyer Report

The Boyer Report has all the attributes of an emancipatory ideological document. Much of its suggested actions are aimed at prestabilisation of supposedly harmonious relationships.<sup>23</sup> Elimination of frictions and tensions between the parties concerned. The contrast to the Bauhaus and the Werkbund programs is clearly expressed — all in the service of a relativistic community, a utopia. This utopia is however not so far from the goals which Maldonado and Aicher had so fervently thrown up against Bill and the idea of the education of the individual. The seven points, which are eudaemonistic sociology and neither pedagogical or didactic components of architectural education are the politically corrected version of the following points of Maldonado and Aicher: “... while maintaining your full influence, should give the opportunity to reduce inter human tensions to a minimum. ... I therefore would suggest that you are no longer active in pedagogic operations, but you should stand above it...”

Just like the political figure he had envisioned in the first program concepts. Maldonado answers Bill, who “maintains:” ... In a design situation which draws on other disciplines and the sciences in order to give itself better buttressing in areas outside of its expertise the use of the Supporting sciences remains beyond the designers control.” He believes that the designer’s role will change and he will be a coordinator. “It will be his business, together with a string of experts, to coordinate the various demands of production and utilization. In short, he will be responsible for a maximized cultural as well as material satisfaction of the consumer.”

And then, as the redefinition of architecture, as Boyer calls it the new purpose: “[T]he industrialization of building, which means, the application of modern methods of production to building technology... Traditional building methods are no longer suitable, to cover the present demands for high rise construction...” This was before the sociologists found out that high-rise construction is bad for human beings. Boyer is now telling us that we must find new ways to build our communities. Pray, tell which ones? And finally, Maldonado makes short shrift of homo ludens. “The HfG has assumed an uncompromising position. In the foundation courses the play techniques are being rejected, to suit an age in which playing is out and responsibility is in.”

It is hard to overlook what seems to be an echo of

Marcuse making a point of Schillers necessity of play as the foundation on which art is to be built, criticizing the arcade culture of the pinball machine, play as *Selbstzweck*, as ultimate consumption without consumables, but he is not criticizing the idea of play as the foundation of art in the classical sense. Adorno's critic of contemporary aesthetics points in the same direction. Their conclusions, however, do not lead us away from the total work ethic of today's consumer society. Neither does anything Boyer says. He gives us sociological responsibilities, which are constant. In his example of lawyers, he speaks of a more just society, as if just were not enough. The seven points are held in this tone. In other words, they are assuming a position of agency of change. If one advocates change in today's academy one is guaranteed popularity among a majority of students and faculty. Change has become synonymous with the exercise of freedom. We are free to change everything we are anchored to, all that made us, all that we need to rely on. We tend to forget that the first privilege of freedom is the right to remain. The right to dwell, to remain in place at peace.<sup>24</sup> But Karl Marx pointed out to us that we cannot become real human beings as a species as long as we dwell in the Rousseauian morass bourgeois society has flung us into.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, man as he stands and walks cannot be trusted to know what is good for him, he must be told. He must be emancipated. And it is through his willingness to shake off the bourgeois sins that he proves to be worthy of living.

Concluding, one feels compelled to remark that in each case cited as an educational example, we find that the cycle remains the same, only that the wheel, before it stops turns just a little more towards emancipatory ideology. Is it a comfort question or is it the lack of philosophical foundation which makes us repeat history and go it one better in a direction, which by its very nature is unsuitable for architectural education? Perhaps we have bought too deeply into the total work ideology of Weber and don't have time to contemplate any longer; no more time and courage to sit back and really critically look at our situation. One thing is certain, if I have just described the history of progress of architectural education then we have not progressed very far. Is it not the first sign of progress that we do not forget what we already know?

## NOTES and REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> This problem solution was attempted in every one of the institutions discussed here. While Gropius and Ferrari were able to keep the two separate and act successfully on them, Bill was obviously knowledgeable of the fallacy but did not have the personal ability to maintain the interpersonal tensions at his institution which were necessary to give it the creative educational atmosphere the other two had.

- <sup>2</sup> The curious mix of critical theory and discursive ethics which in some academic quarters is viewed as a possible synthesis of value generative ideologies, which this paper refers to as emancipatory educational ideology, must appear totally incomprehensible outside of academe. That much of this is used by some as intellectual capital only while others are seriously struggling with its implications pro cannot make much difference to the non-initiated.
- <sup>3</sup> It is debatable and being debated vigorously whether they are good for anybody even as we speak.
- <sup>4</sup> Only in the strictest classical sense of the term, not in the terminology of modern ethics.
- <sup>5</sup> Aristotelian.
- <sup>6</sup> Kantian, also referred to as formal ethics. See 9.
- <sup>7</sup> Niklas Luhmann, *Gesellschaftsstruktur und Semantik*.
- <sup>8</sup> Josef Pieper, *Leisure the Basis of Culture* (New York: Pantheon Books Inc.).
- <sup>9</sup> Adalbert Stifter's educational novel, *The Indian Summer*, gives an idealized account of such a life.
- <sup>10</sup> Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1940).
- <sup>11</sup> Niklas Luhmann, *Zweck-Herrschaft-System, Grundbegriffe und premissen Max Webers*. In *Schriften zum öffentlichen Recht* (Der Staat, February 1964).
- <sup>12</sup> Niklas Luhmann, *Zweckbegriff und Rationalität, Suhrkamp* (1978).
- <sup>13</sup> Max Scheler, in his book, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* (original 1913-16) (Northwestern University Press 1973), gives the most positive account of the necessity of value ethics in an attempt to answer to Nietzsche's critique of ethics in "Morgenröte." The problem with value ethics in today's societies lies in the fact that Scheler based his entire thesis on an immense metaphysical underpinning, which is not generally available in today's society.
- <sup>14</sup> Herrmann Muthesius, *The English House*.
- <sup>15</sup> Walter Gropius, *The New Architecture and the Bauhaus* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
- <sup>16</sup> Reginald R. Isaacs, *Walter Gropius, der Mensch und sein Werk* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1983).
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> Hans Wingler, *The Bauhaus*, (Cambridge: MIT Press). Olivio Ferrari is much remembered for a similar ability in developing specific talents in individuals.
- <sup>19</sup> Rainer K. Wick, *Bauhaus Pädagogie* (Dumont, 1994).
- <sup>20</sup> Eva von Seckendorff, *Die Hochschule für Gestaltung in Ulm* (Jonas Verlag, 1989).
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> Robert Spaemann, *Zur Kritik der politischen Utopie* (Ernst Klett Verlag Stuttgart, 1977).
- <sup>23</sup> Robert Spaemann, *Emancipation - ein Bildungsziel?*
- <sup>24</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Wohnen, Bauen, Denken*.
- <sup>25</sup> Karl Marx, *Kritik des Gothaer Programms*.